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NOTE
PERFORMER'S RIGHT OF PUBLICITY:
A LIMITATION ON NEWS PRIVILEGE
T HE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY PROTECTS an individual's right to control the use of a
personal asset such as his name, likeness, or performance, which has
acquired pecuniary value through the investment of time, effort, or money.'
Although this right has gained increasing recognition since the 1950's, it has
often been confused with the right of privacy, out of which the right of
publicity evolved.2 Some courts in particular have erred by applying the
news privilege, which protects the individual from invasions of privacy, to
invasions of the right of publicity.
3
In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,4 the United States
Supreme Court held that the news media is not privileged under the first and
fourteenth amendments to broadcast a performer's entire act without his
consent. Scripps-Howard videotaped, without consent, Zacchini's fifteen-
second "human cannonball" act at a county fair in Ohio and broadcast the
entire performance on its evening news program. The Supreme Court held
that under these facts the Constitution did not prevent a state from providing
a damage remedy for invasion of the right of publicity, a cause of action
which was recognized by the Court as a new basis for tort liability distinct
from the right of privacy. The Court refused to apply the New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan5 constitutional privilege, however, limiting the applicability of
that privilege to cases involving defamation or non-defamatory falsehood.
Although the Zacchini decision may be considered by some to be a move
toward censorship of the media, the case was correctly decided. The Court's
analysis, however, was incomplete. The Court adopted the Ohio Supreme
Court's characterization of the right of publicity as one form of the right of
privacy,6 yet treated violation of the right of publicity as a separate tort, and
publicity itself as a form of intellectual property akin to copyright. It is the
position of this Note that the right of publicity is entirely separate from the
right of privacy, and that clarification of this distinction will alleviate the
confusion which has long muddied this area of tort law.
Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 203,216 (1954).
2 See note 53 infra and accompanying text.
3 See notes 142-47 infra and accompanying text.
4 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
5 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The essence of the New York Times privilege is that a public official
may not be awarded damages for a defamatory news report concerning his official functions
unless it is shown that the story was motivated by actual malice or was published in reckless
disregard of its truth or falsity.
6 The Ohio Supreme Court held: "The performer of a'human cannonball' act has a right to the
publicity value of its performance, and the appropriation of that right over his objection without
license or privilege is an invasion of his privacy." Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,
47 Ohio St. 2d 224, 351 N.E.2d 454 (1976) (syllabus at 2). The United States Supreme Court
relied, as did the Ohio court, on Dean Prosser's analysis of the right of privacy. Prosser divides
the right of privacy into four forms, one of which is appropriation. Both the Ohio and United
States Supreme Courts also referred to this form as the right of publicity. For a further discussion
of Prosser's analysis, see notes 56-50 infra and accompanying text.
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The Zacchini majority also failed to answer completely the dissenters'
criticism that the holding drew a boundary on the news privilege in violation
of the first amendment. Despite its lack of clarity in analysis, however, the
Zacchini decision does not leave the press unable to fulfill its vital informing
function. This Note will demonstrate that a clear distinction between
publicity and privacy would enable the press to discern those situations in
which it is privileged to report on newsworthy activities of celebrities,7 and
that the press may define its privilege to entertainers' actual performances by
referring to the traditional bounds of fair comment.8
I. THE ZACCHINI OPINION
Petitioner, Hugo Zacchini, is a professional entertainer who performs a
fifteen-second "human cannonball" act in which he is shot from a cannon into
a net some 200 feet away.9 The act was performed regularly at the Geauga
County Fair in Burton, Ohio in August and September of 1972. The
performances took place on the fair ground in a fenced-in area surrounded by
grandstands, but no separate admission was charged to see the act. A
freelance reporter for respondent's Cleveland television station, WEWS,
attempted to film one of petitioner's performances, but was asked not to do so
by Zacchini, who had noticed the reporter's camera.'0 The reporter did not
film the act that day, but returned the next day and videotaped the entire act
on the instructions of the producer of respondent's Eyewitness News pro-
gram. This fifteen-second film clip was shown on the 11:00 news that night,
together with favorable commentary by the newscaster."
Petitioner brought an action for damages, alleging that respondent
"showed and commercialized the film of his act without his consent," which
was "an unlawful appropriation of plaintiff's professional property."' 2 The
Supreme Court of Ohio, in affirming the trial court's summary judgment for
respondent, found that petitioner's complaint stated a cause of action for
invasion of his right of publicity, but that respondent was nevertheless
privileged to broadcast the film.' 3
See notes 146-147 infra and accompanying text.
See notes 148-52 infra and accompanying text.
Petitioner claimed that the act was originated by his father and has been performed
exclusively by his family for 50 years. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
10 News reporters and cameramen were admitted to the fair without charge by the fair's
promoters in order to stimulate publicity for the fair. The promoters placed no restrictions on
news coverage of petitioner's act or any other attraction at the fair. Brief for Respondent at 2-3,
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
" The script of the commentary read:
This .. .now . .. is the story of a true spectator sport . .. the sport of human
cannonballing ... in fact, the great Zacchini is about the only human cannonball
around, these days . . . just happens that, where he is, is the great Geauga County Fair,
in Burton ... and believe me, although it's not a long act, it's a thriller ... and you
really need to see it in person . . . to appreciate it.
Appendix to Brief for Petitioner at 12, 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (emphasis in original).
12 Appendix to Brief for Respondent at 4-5.
M3 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 47 Ohio St. 2d 224,351 N.E.2d 454 (1976).
The trial court had granted summary judgment to defendant Scripps-Howard on the ground
that the broadcast of the plaintiff's act was constitutionally privileged. Zacchini v. Scripps-
Howard Broadcasting Co., No. 73-918826 (C.P. Cuyahoga County April 29, 1974). The Ohio
[Vol. 26: 587
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A. The Majority: Protection for Entertainer's Performance
Justice White, writing for the majority in the United States Supreme
Court, stated the issue as "whether the first and fourteenth amendments
immunized respondent from damages for its alleged infringement of petition-
er's state law 'right of publicity.' "14 The Court reversed the Supreme Court
of Ohio, holding that respondent was not privileged to broadcast the film.
15
Because the right of publicity arises under state law, the Court followed
the Ohio Supreme Court's formulation of the tort. The Ohio court had held
that the news media is privileged to make news reports on matters of public
interest which would otherwise be protected by the right of publicity, absent
an intent to injure, or to appropriate that right for some non-privileged private
use.' 6 The Ohio court also held, and the Supreme Court majority agreed, that
this use or benefit need not be commercial. 17 The right of publicity in Ohio
Court of Appeals reversed the summary judgment, holding that Zacchini should prevail on the
theories of conversion and invasion of common-law copyright, despite the fact that neither
theory has been briefed or argued by the parties. One judge, concurring in the result only, wrote
a separate opinion based on the theory of appropriation of the common law right of publicity.
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., No. 33713 (Ohio Ct. App. July 10, 1975). The
Ohio Supreme Court, in reversing the court of appeals and affirming the trial court, rejected the
common law copyright and conversion theories as inapplicable to this case. Zacchiniv. Scripps-
Howard Broadcasting Co., 47 Ohio St. 2d 224, 226-28, 351 N.E.2d 454,456-57 (1976). A writ of
certiorari was then granted by the United States Supreme Court. 429 U.S. 1037 (1977).
14 433 U.S. at 565. The Court began its opinion by explaining its grounds for taking
jurisdiction in the case. Respondent argued that the Court lacked jurisdiction stating that the
Ohio Supreme Court decision rested on an adequate and independent state ground. Brief for
Respondent at 9-13. The Court acknowledged that petitioner's complaint was based on state tort
law and that the right of publicity is a right created by state law. The Court also pointed out that
the Ohio court's opinion failed to identify the source of the privilege which it found respondent to
have. Neither the Ohio constitution nor the first amendment of the United States Constitution
was cited by the Ohio Supreme Court. Justice White determined, however, that the Ohio
opinion rested solely on federal grounds, placing principal reliance on the fact that the Ohio
opinion cited first amendment cases such as New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964),
and Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). 433 U.S. at 566-67.
Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion, also found the basis of the Ohio Supreme Court's
holding to be ambiguous. Although he felt the opinion could be read as resting entirely on
federal constitutional grounds, he thought it more likely that the Ohio court's finding of a
privilege was a limitation on the common law tort, rather than a federal constitutional right.
Stevens suggested remanding the case to the Ohio Supreme Court for clarification of its holding.
433 U.S. at 583.
15 The decision was 5-3-1. The majority included Justices White, Burger, Blackmun;
Rehnquist, and Stewart. Those dissenting were Justices Powell, Brennan, and Marshall. JusticE
Stevens wrote a separate dissent on jurisdictional grounds only. See note 14 supra.
16 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 47 Ohio St. 2d 224, 235,351 N.E.2d 454,461
(1976). The Ohio Supreme Court based its finding of a press privilege on the New York Times
rule, which holds the media liable on a showing of intent or recklessness. See text accompanying
note107infra. However, the Ohio Supreme Court declined to decide whether the press could be
liable for invasion of the right of publicity on a showing of recklessness. The Ohio court's holding
requires a showing of "actual intent." 47 Ohio St. 2d at 235, 351 N.E.2d at 461. The Supreme
Court also limited its holding to a situation involving actual intent, noting that "[r]espondent
knew exactly that petitioner objected to televising his act, but nevertheless displayed the entire
film." 433 U.S. at 578.
The dissent implied that petitioner was a public figure within the meaning of Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), and that a negligence standard might therefore be sufficient to
find respondent liable. See note 49 infra.
17 47 Ohio St. 2d at 229-30,351 N.E.2d at 458. The Supreme Court decided that the television
station was not privileged to broadcast petitioner's act even though the broadcast occurred on a
regular news program, as opposed to a commercial program. The dissent would have required a
showing of commercial use in order to find liability. See note 90 infra.
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gives an individual "personal control over commercial display and exploita-
tion of his personality and the exercise of his talents.' 8 This right is a valuable
benefit attained through a performer's talents and efforts, and is not lost
merely by performing before the public. 19 The Ohio court held that the right
of publicity is synonymous with the interest protected by the appropriation
form of the right of privacy, and identified plaintiff's claim as the invasion of
his privacy by appropriation.2 0 The Supreme Court accepted this classifica-
tion of publicity as one of the forms of privacy. 21
The Supreme Court noted that Zacchini did not claim that his perfor-
mance could not be reported at all by the press. Both the majority and dissent
assumed that petitioner's human cannonball act was a newsworthy event. 22
Petitioner's objection was to the taking of his professional property, which
the Court characterized as essentially a pecuniary claim. Entertainment can
be news, and a news report that does not appropriate an entire performance
could be privileged under the Zacchini standard. 23 The Court narrowly
limited its refusal to extend the constitutional press privilege to cases involv-
ing the use of a performer's entire act without his consent, and did not intend
its holding to apply necessarily to all possible invasions of privacy by
appropriation, such as unauthorized use of a plaintiff's picture for advertis-
ing. 24
Justice White wrote that the Ohio Supreme Court's finding of a first
amendment privilege was based upon an overly-broad reading of Time, Inc.
v. Hill.2 5 In Time, the petitioner brought an action against Life Magazine for
invasion of privacy. In its review of a new play which was based loosely on
an incident involving petitioner and his family, the publication gave the false
impression that the play portrayed the incident as it actually occurred. The
Supreme Court applied the New York Times standard to Time, which was a
privacy case, and held that the opening of a new play linked to an actual
incident was a matter of public interest which the press was privileged to
report, absent a showing that the report was knowingly false or was published
in reckless disregard of the truth. Time, the Court explained in Zacchini,
does not support a privilege to broadcast a performer's entire act without his
consent, because Time was intended to apply only to the false light type of
invasion of privacy, a tort distinct from invasion of the right of publicity.26 By
11 47 Ohio St. 2d at 231,351 N.E.2d at 459.
'9 433 U.S. at 569-70. See note 99 infra and accompanying text.
20 47 Ohio St. 2d at 226,351 N.E.2d at 456.
21 See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
22 433 U.S. at 569, 582.
2'3 The Court's holding was limited to a situation in which, as in Zacchini, an entire act for
which the performer ordinarily is paid is shown without permission. The Court did not state
whether showing part of a performance on a news program would be privileged. The Court
implied that the privilege of fair comment is applicable to the right of publicity, stating that
newsworthy facts about a performance can be reported by the news media. 433 U.S. at 574-75.
Under the privilege of fair comment the press is generally allowed to use in its reports excerpts
from the work being commented upon. See notes 148-52 infra and accompanying text.
24 433 U.S. at 573 n.10. The dissent also limited its opinion to the facts of this case.
Id. at 579 (Powell, J. dissenting).
25 386 U.S. 374 (1967).
26 Time did not explicitly limit its holding to the false light type of invasion of privacy, but the
[Vol. 26: 587
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explicitly limiting the holding of Time to one form of the right of privacy, the
Court indicated that it never intended the constitutional privilege to be
applied either to the other three forms of the right of privacy, or to other torts.
This ruling clarified the applicability of Time, which had been left in some
doubt after Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.27 and Time, Inc. v. Firestone.2 8 The
narrowness of the Court's holding in Zacchini was to be expected, given its
caution in Time against too broad an application of the New York Times
standard. 29
The Court found no support in cases decided subsequent to Time for the
application of a constitutional privilege to the right of publicity. Rosenbloom
v. Metromedia, Inc.,30 Gertz, and Firestone all involved defamation, as did
New York Times.31 The defamation cases and Time also involved news
reports of "events," particularly those involving public officials and public
figures, which the majority distinguished from reports presenting an entire act
for which the performer ordinarily receives compensation.
First amendment press rights, stated the Court, are not abridged by the
protection of a performer's right to publicity. Justice White compared
the individual and state interests protected by the right of publicity with
those protected by the federal copyright and patent laws. Since the first
amendment does not prohibit the grant of statutory protection to
creators of works of art and other types of intellectual property, 32
neither should it present the protection of entire performances against
unauthorized use. Continuing with his copyright analogy, Justice White
Zacchini Court found implicit support for its narrow reading of Time in the fact that the Time
opinion cited Prosser's four-part analysis of the right of privacy, which distinguishes false light
from the other three forms. See notes 56-60 infra and accompanying text. Compare Time, Inc.
v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 381, 383 n.7, 384-85 n.9 (1967), with Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 571-72 (1977).
For a discussion of the distinctions between the right of privacy and the right of publicity, see
notes 54-99 infra and accompanying text.
27 418 U.S. 323 (1974). For the facts of this case, see note 123 infra.
2 424 U.S. 448(1976). See text accompanying notes 121-26 infra.
In its comments on the Second Restatement of Torts section on right of privacy, which was
officially adopted in 1976, the American Law Institute questioned the constitutionality of holding
the news media liable for damages for truthful reporting of private facts about the plaintiff.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, Special Note on Relation of Section 652D to the First
Amendment to the Constitution (1977). The Institute also noted that the Supreme Court has not
yet indicated whether the negligence standard applied to defamation of a private individual in
Gertz also applies to false light invasion of privacy. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E,
Comment d (1977).
29 In Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 390-91 (1967), the Court warned against "blind
application" of the New York Times rule to situations other than libel actions by public officials,
without a fresh determination in each case that the rationale for the rule supports its application to
the new set of facts.
30 403 U.S. 29 (1971). Plaintiff, a distributor of nudist magazines, was referred to by a radio
station's news broadcast as a "girlie-book peddler" engaged in the "smut literature racket" during
his arrest and trial for obscenity. After his acquittal, Rosenbloom sued the radio station for libel.
The Supreme Court upheld the jury verdict holding that the New York Times actual malice
standard applies to libel of a private individual who is engaged in "matters of public or general
concern." 403 U.S. at 44.
31 The Ohio Supreme Court majority in Zacchini was criticized by the dissenting justice for
failing to consider Gertz and Firestone. 47 Ohio St. 2d 224,236-44,351 N.E.2d 455,462-66(1976)
(Celebrezze, J., dissenting).
32 See notes 133-41 inf ra and accompanying text.
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implied that the supremacy clause 33 would not prevent a state from recogniz-
ing a cause of action to restrict an entertainer's rights to his performance, just
as the Constitution does not prevent states from protecting creations and
inventions which fall outside the scope of the copyright and patent laws.34
The effect of the Zacchini decision is still unclear because the Court left
considerable freedom to the states in the application of its holding, as it did in
Gertz. The Court held in Gertz that states may define for themselves the
appropriate standard of liability for defamation of a private individual, so
long as they do not impose liability without fault.35 Any other standard, from
negligence to intent, may be used. The Zacchini majority, stating that Ohio's
damage remedy for invasion of privacy is not "a species of liability without
fault contrary to the letter or spirit of Gertz,"36 implied that other states may
hold the news media liable for invasion of publicity on a showing of
negligence or recklessness, even though the Ohio Supreme Court required a
showing of actual intent. Expanding further upon the states' rights philo-
sophy of Gertz, the Zacchini decision permits the states to fashion their own
press privileges in privacy cases as a matter of state law, although the first and
' "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States ... shall be the supreme Law of the
Land ... the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CoNsT.
art. VI, cl. 2.
34 The Court held in Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973) and Kewanee Oil Corp. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974), that states may provide a cause of action to protect creations
and inventions that fall outside the scope of the federal copyright (Goldstein) and patent
(Kewanee) laws. But see Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964) and Compco
Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964). These earlier cases that state laws which
provide a cause of action for protection of non-patentable lamp designs clash with the objectives
of the federal patent laws, and are violative of the supremacy cause. To add to the confusion,
neither Goldstein nor Kewanee explicitly overruled Sears and Compco.
Section 301 of the new copyright law, which took effect on January 1, 1978, provides that the
federal copyright laws will preempt all legal and equitable rights that are the equivalent of
federal copyright. Section 2 of the former copyright law reserved to the states the power to
protect so-called "common-law copyright," meaning the author's rights prior to publication of a
copyrightable work. The revised statute allows states to provide statutory or common law
protection only for non-copyrightable subject matter. 17 U.S.C. § 2 (1970), as amended by
Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 301, 90 Stat. 2541. State causes of action which will
not be preempted include the right of publicity, the right of privacy, defamation, fraud, and trade
secrets. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 9th Cong., 2d Sess. 132 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & An. NEws 5659,574448.
A live performance such as Zacchini's is not copyrightable under either the former copyright
law, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-320 (1970), or the new law. See note 140 infra and accompanying text.
35 418 U.S. at 347.
36 433 U.S. at 578. In the Zacchini case there was no question of liability without fault
because respondent had been given oral notice that petitioner objected to the filming of his act.
The Court did not discuss whether holding a defendant liable for invasion of publicity where no
notice had been given would constitute liability without fault. The Ohio Supreme Court
speculated that a performer would abandon his right of publicity by failing to give reasonable
notice to the public. 47 Ohio St. 2d at 232, 351 N.E.2d at 460. Other courts have taken the
opposite view, holding that an entertainer does not lose rights in his performance merely by
performing. Instead, these courts have found the objective character of the dissemination to the
public and the performer's intent with regard to relinquishment of his rights to be the determining
factors. E.g., Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 444, 194 A. 631, 636
(1937). See note 99 infra and accompanying text. Entertainers generally give notice to the
public that unauthorized recording, filming, or broadcasting is prohibited by printing a written
warning on tickets or programs. See Twentieth Century Sporting Club, Inc. v. Transradio Press
Service, Inc., 165 Misc. 71,300 N.Y.S. 159 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
[Vol. 26: 587
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fourteenth amendments do not require them to do so.," If states may define
the scope of the tort, the Court reasoned, they may also define the scope
of the privilege, so long as they rely clearly on state, rather than federal,
guarantees of freedom of the press.
The Burger Court will probably continue to apply a strong federalist
solution to conflicts between state tort laws and freedom of the press, whether
the tort involved is invasion of publicity, invasion of privacy, or defamation.
The media must certainly be held liable for torts committed during the
course of news gathering, 38 but if sorrie states choose to restrict the media to a
far greater extent than others, the rights of multi-state broadcasters, and
newspapers will vary widely among the different states. Such Balkanization
of freedom of the press would tend naturally to produce self-censorship in the
news media.39
B, The Dissent: No Abridgement of Press Privilege
The dissenters criticized the majority for failing to provide a clear and
workable standard to guide the news media. Justice Powell, who wrote the
majority opinion in Gertz, opposed the prohibition upon the broadcast of a
performer's entire act without his consent. Powell wrote that the majority's
quantitative test, based upon whether the entire act was taken, was an
incorrect mode of analysis. The determination of when a performance
actually begins and ends is one the dissent thought would be too difficult for
news editors to make.4" This argument is simplistic and unpersuasive, for an
entire act may easily be characterized as anything the performer does for pay,
from the time he initially appears before the public to the time he leaves and
disappears from public view.
The test which Powell would apply to an invasion of privacy situation is
whether the media's use of the performance was a subterfuge for private or
commercial exploitation. 4I Absent a strong showing of such exploitation, the
dissent would hold that use of a film during "a routine portion of a regular
news program" is protected by the first amendment. 42 The dissent saw the
threat of media self-censorship in the possibility of tort liability for an
ordinary news report.43 The effect of this reasoning would be to immunize
the news media from liability for virtually every invasion of an individual's
right of publicity. It is extremely difficult to prove commercial use in a news
', 433 U.S. at 578-79. The Court remanded the case to the Supreme Court of Ohio for
reconsideration of the privilege issue solely as a matter of Ohio law.
31 See note 113 infra.
31 Cf. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); Smith v. California, 361
U.S. 147 (1959) (state laws and policies that tend to cause self-censorship violate the first
amendment).
" 433 U.S. at 579 n.1. The dissent said it was likely that Zacchini's act had been preceded
by some form of ceremonial fanfare; if it had been, then respondent had not appropriated the
entire act.
.n 433 U.S. at 581. Justice Powell did not indicate what sort of private, non-commercial
exploitation he had in mind. lle did not consider use on a news program to be unlawful
exploitation.
42 Id.
43 433 U.S. at 580. See note 38 supra.
1977]
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context, since the fact that the news media are commercially sponsored and
operated for profit has been held not to constitute commercial use.
4
Justice Powell distinguished the showing of Zacchini's act on a news
program from unauthorized commercial broadcasts of sporting events and
theatrical performances "where the broadcaster keeps the profits." 45 But this
distinction makes no sense because Zacchini, like sports figures and actors,
performs for profit. His property interest in his performance, which is
violated by an unauthorized broadcast, is the same interest violated by
unauthorized broadcasts of other types of performances.4 6 Furthermore,
there may no longer be a real difference between news and so-called
commercial programming, for many news shows have become highly
commercialized and entertainment-oriented .
47
Drawing upon his reasoning in Gertz, Justice Powell postulated that
petitioner, having chosen to make his act newsworthy by performing in
public, had waived his right to object to routine news coverage of the
performance. 4  Powell contrasted Zacchini with plaintiffs in invasion of
privacy actions, who generally seek to avoid public exposure. The Zacchini
dissenters would apply an analysis based upon the status of the plaintiff as a
public figure or private individual in both publicity and privacy cases, just as
Gertz applied in a defamation action standards which differ with the status of
the plaintiff. 49 But the Gertz concept of waiver of rights by a public figure
44 "That books, newspapers, and magazines are published and sold for profit does not prevent
them from being a form of expression whose liberty is safeguarded by the First Amendment."
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374,397 (1967) (citations omitted). In order to find commercial use by
the news media, courts require a showing that the thing appropriated was directly connected
with advertising carried on the news broadcast. E.g., Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 304 N.Y. 354,
107 N.E.2d 485 (1952); Young v. That Was the Week That Was, 312 F. Supp. 1337 (N.D. Ohio
1969), aff'd, 423 F.2d 265 (6th Cir. 1970). See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 806 (4th ed.
1971).
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the Court held that the New York
Times was privileged to publish defamatory falsehoods about a public official, even though the
statements were made in an advertisement, because the ad was an "editorial advertisement"
which communicated information of a political nature. 376 U.S. at 266.
45 433 U.S. at 580.
46 See notes 73 & 81 infra and accompanying text.
17 See notes 170-77 infra and accompanying text. Courts have utilized the news privilege
rationale to deny recovery to plaintiffs whose publicity rights were appropriated for clearly
commercial purposes. This has been so, for example, in cases arising under New York's privacy
statute, which requires a showing of advertising or trade use by the defendant. See note 91 infra.
In Man v. Warner Bros., 317 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), the use in the film "Woodstock" of
plaintiff's short, impromptu performance onstage at the Woodstock Festival was held to be within
the news privilege, even though the film was shown for profit in commercial theaters. Accord,
Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 58 Misc. 2d 1, 294 N.Y.S.2d 122 (Sup. Ct.
1968), aff'd mem., 32 App. Div. 2d 892, 301 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1969) (privilege to publish and sell
truthful biography of Howard Hughes); Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 444, 299
N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1968) (privilege to manufacture and sell posters of mock Presidential
candidate who became newsworthy figure by his satirical candidacy).
48 433 U.S. at 582.
49 In its constitutional privilege cases the Supreme Court has used "status" and "public
interest" analysis to determine the applicability of the privilege in particular situations. Note,
Triangulating the Limits on the Tort of Invasion of Privacy: The Development of the Remedy in
Light of the Expansion of Constitutional Privilege, 3 HAsrINGs CONST. L. Q. 543, 565-66 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as HASTINGS].
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388
U.S. 130 (1967), the scope of the privilege was determined by the status of the plaintiff. The 8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol26/iss4/10
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should not be applied in publicity cases because the result is to deny
protection to those performers and celebrities in the public eye who have
acquired the greatest publicity value, and who are in need of the greatest
protection. 50
II. RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND RIGHT OF PRIVACY:
Two DISTINCT TORTS
The right of publicity evolved into a separate basis for tort liability out of
necessity, because the older right of privacy proved inadequate to protect
individuals from appropriation of their names, likenesses, and performan-
ces.51 Dean Prosser, and the Second Restatement of Torts which reflects
Prosser's influence, describe the right of privacy as a complex of four torts
which, although related in name, have nothing more in common than that
each represents "an interference with the right of the Plaintiff 'to be let
alone.' "52 Much confusion has been created when courts have attempted to
apply Prosser's principles to an appropriation situation, as in Zacchini, for the
result is an unsuccessful attempt to treat two separate and distinct torts as
one.5 3 The parameters of each tort will be clearly defined in this Note in order
to end this confusion.
question of whether he was a public official or public figure was crucial. In Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385
U.S. 374 (1967), the determinant for a plaintiff who was a private individual was whether or not he
was involved in a matter of public interest. However, public interest analysis, especially as it was
broadly applied in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29,42 (1971), was rejected by the
Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,343, (1974), and in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424
U.S. 448, 454-56 (1976). See note 121 infra.
The Rosenbloom Court felt that the distinction between public and private persons was
artificial in modem society. 403 U.S. at 41. Gertz, however, re-emphasized the importance of
making the distinction between public and private individuals. The Court stated that the states
have a greater interest in protecting private individuals from defamation than public officials and
public figures, because public persons assume the risk of defamation by voluntarily placing
themselves before the public. The Gertz Court also reasoned that private individuals have fewer
opportunities to gain access to the media for rebuttal of a defamatory falsehood. 418 U.S. at 343-
45. See Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and Walker, 1967
Sup. CT. REV. 267, 298.
10 See notes 95-99 infra and accompanying text. Status analysis should not be applied to the
right of publicity because private individuals as well as celebrities have property rights in their
names and likenesses. See note 90 infra.
51 Nimmer, supra note 1, at 203-04; E. KINTNER & J. LAHR, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
PRIMER 453 (1975).
52 W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 804 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
652A, Comment b (1977). The Second Restatement of Torts went through several drafts of
section 652 on invasion of privacy before adopting the current form in 1976. The Ohio Supreme
Court relied on Tentative Draft No. 13, completed in 1967. The chief differences between
Tentative Draft No. 13 and the final form are the addition to the final version of the requirement
that an invasion of privacy must be unreasonable to be actionable, and the elimination in the final
form of a separate subsection on news privilege. The 1976 formulation and the section would
have applied the constitutional privilege to the public disclosure and false light forms of invasion
of privacy. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652F, Comment k (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1967).
The 1977 revision applies the constitutional privilege only to actions based on false light. See
note 28 supra. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652 (Tent. Draft No. 20, 1975; Tent.
Draft No. 22, 1976).
53 See Gordon, Right of Property in Name, Likeness, Personality and History, 55 Nw. U.L.
REV. 553,554-55 (1960). In Carson v. National Bank of Commence, 501 F.2d 1082 (8th Cir. 1974),
television personality Johnny Carson sued under publicity theory for the unauthorized use of his
name and photograph in an advertisement. The court equated the right to control the use of
1977]
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A. An Analysis of the Two Torts
The right to privacy was first recognized following publication of a
pioneering article by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in 1890.54 The right
to privacy, as Warren and Brandeis formulated it, protects the individual's
"right to be let alone," and provides a remedy for injury to the plaintiff's
feelings caused by unwanted publicity about his private affairs. Warren and
Brandeis derived this new right from the common-law property right of an
individual in his personal letters or literary works, which provided a cause of
action for their publication without his consent. Warren and Brandeis
intended their new right to be broader than the earlier property right,
however, labeling the new principle "the right to one's personality.
'
"
55
The most widely accepted modem explanation of the right of privacy is
the Prosser-Restatement analysis of privacy as an amalgam of four torts:56
1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff's physical solitude or into his private
affairs;57
2. Public disclosure of private facts about the plaintiff;5"
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public
eye;59 and
4. Appropriation for the defendant's advantage of the plaintiff's
name or likeness.6"
one's name and image with the right of privacy and denied recovery to Carson because Nebraska
law does not recognize a right of privacy.
54 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
55 Id. at 205-07. The type of privacy interest Warren and Brandeis discussed is that which
Prosser later called public disclosure of private facts. Warren and Brandeis were concerned with
keeping the details of an individual's personal life or personal papers out of the press.
Prosser's four-part analysis of the right of privacy, described in notes 56-60 and accompanying
text inf ra, has been criticized for being based upon a complete misunderstanding of the tort that
Warren and Brandeis initiated. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to
Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (1964).
For an account of the development of the right of privacy up to the middle of this century, See
Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 384-88 (1960).
56 Prosser, supra note 55; W. PROSSER, LAW OF Towrs § 117 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A - 6521 (1977).
The right of privacy has been analyzed in other ways as well. The interests protected by
privacy are described differently in 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 9.6, at 681
(1956), and in Green, The Right of Privacy, 27 ILL. L. REV. 237 (1932).
Perhaps the strongest critic of Prosser's analysis is Bloustein, who describes the right of
privacy as a unitary tort which protects only one interest. That interet is human dignity, which
remains the same regardless of the form the intrusion takes. This same interest in human dignity
underlies the constitutional protection of privacy. Bloustein, supra note 55, passim.
51 E.g., Estate of Berthiaume v. Pratt, 365 A.2d 792 (Me. 1976) (physician entered hospital
room and made unauthorized photograph of his patient); Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133
N.E.2d 340 (1956) (harrassing telephone calls from bill collector).
58 E.g., Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d,1122 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976)
(magazine story about California surfers included accounts of one surfer's eccentric private
acts, such as eating spiders); Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 133 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
311 U.S. 711 (1940) (magazine article about private life of child prodigy who later sought to live in
obscurity as an adult).
59 E.g., Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974) (newspaper story about
aftereffects of bridge disaster falsely portrayed family of deceased victim as living in abject
poverty); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (See text accompanying notes 25-26 supra).
60 E.g., Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905) (insurance
advertisement published in newspaper used plaintiff's name and photograph without his
[Vol. 26: 587
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The right of publicity was first recognized as a tort distinct from the right
of privacy in Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.,61 an
action brought under the New York privacy statute.6 2  Plaintiff had an
exclusive contract with a baseball player for the use of his picture on "baseball
cards" sold with its bubble gum. Defendant was alleged to have violated this
exclusive license by making a similar agreement with the same baseball
player. Defendant contended that the ballplayer's only interest in the
publication of his picture was his "right of privacy," a personal and non-
assignable right not to have his feelings hurt by such a publication. 3 The
court disagreed with this contention:
We think that, in addition to and independent of that right of privacy
(which in New York derives from statute), a man has a right to the
publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive
privilege of publishing his picture ...
This right might be called a 'right of publicity.' For . . . many
prominent persons . . . , far from having their feelings bruised
through public exposure of their likenesses, would feel sorely
deprived if the ' no longer received money for authorizing ad-
vertisements . . . [and] popularizing their countenances . . . .4
The interests protected by the rights of privacy and publicity are quite
different, as the Zacchini Court noted. 5 Intrusion protects the right of the
plaintiff to physical isolation from others; public disclosure protects the
interest in keeping facts of the plaintiff's reputation.66 The state's interest in
providing a cause of action for invasion of privacy is in the redress of
plaintiff's mental distress resulting from the invasion of his privacy.6 7 The
consent); Palmer v. Schonhorn Enterprises, Inc., 96 N.J. Super. 72, 232 A.2d 458 (1967)
(unauthorized use of famous golfer's name and biographical data in game sold commercially).
Both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Ohio Supreme Court considered the right of publicity to
be synonymous with the appropriation form of privacy in their Zacchini opinions. Accord,
Carson v. National Bank of Commerce, 501 F.2d 1082 (8th Cir. 1974). Because it is the position of
this Note that the right of publicity is a different tort from the right of privacy, appropriation will
be discussed as the right of publicity.
The recently completed revision of the Second Restatement of Torts section 652 on invasion
of privacy notes the distinction between appropriation and other forms of invasion of privacy,
although appropriation remains classified as one form of privacy. After describing privacy as a
complex of four distinct, though related wrongs, the drafters comment: "Even this nexus
becomes tenuous in the case of the appropriation of name or likeness covered by § 652C, which
appears rather to confer something analogous to a property right upon the individual."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A, Comment b (1977). By analogizing appropriation to a
property right for which an exclusive license may be given, id. § 652C, Comment b., while at the
same time describing privacy as a non-assignable personal right, id. § 6521, the Restatement
drafters have set up an inconsistency in section 652 which can be resolved only by recognizing the
right of publicity as a separate tort.
11 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
62 See note 91 infra.
63 202 F.2d at 868.
64 Id.
65 433 U.S. at 573. The Court was referring only to the false light type of privacy in
contrasting privacy with publicity.
66 See generally Prosser, supra note 55.
67 Id. at 392, 398, 400. One commentator has predicted that the entire tort of invasion of
privacy may eventually become part of a larger tort of intentional infliction of metal suffering
1977]
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right of publicity, in contrast, protects a purely pecuniary interest of the
plaintiff - his right "to control and profit from the publicity values which he
has created or purchased."6 A plaintiff may have a right of publicity as to his
name,69 likeness, 70 personal history, 71 personality or style of performing,72 and
his performance.7 3 Providing a cause of action for invasion of the right of
publicity, the Court stated, promotes the state's interest in encouraging the
creation of entertainment,much as the copyright and patent laws encourage
other types of creativity by permitting the individual to reap financial rewards
from his work. This interest, the Court noted, has little to do with salving hurt
feelings or reputation, which can be protected by false light and defamation
actions.
7 1
Another major distinction between privacy and publicity lies in the nature
of the rights involved. The right of privacy is a personal right, 75 and only the
individual whose privacy has been invaded may bring a cause of action.7 6
The right to sue for invasion of privacy may not be inherited in the absence of
statute.77  The right of publicity, on the other hand, is a property right.
7 1
which would also include defamation and assault. Wade, Defamation and the Right of Privacy,
15 VAND. L. REV. 1093 (1962).
A cause of action for invasion of privacy may be combined with a claim for emotional distress.
See, e.g., Galella v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), afJ'd as modified, 487 F.2d 986
(2d Cir. 1973).
11 Nimmer, supra note 1, at 216.
Appropriation was distinguished from the other forms of privacy as involving a pecuniary
injury rather than a mental one in Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reyonlds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821
(9th Cir. 1974). But cf. Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953) (privacy protects hurt feelings rather than pecuniary
interest). See generally Gordon, supra note 53.
19 E.g., Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D.C. Minn. 1970); Cepeda v. Swift & Co.,
415 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1969).
10 E.g., Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Hogan v. A.S. Barnes & Co.,
114 U.S.P.Q. 314 (C.P. Philadelphia County Pa. 1957).
11 E.g., Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Urban Sys., Inc., 72 Misc. 2d 788,340 N.Y.S.2d 144 (Sup.
Ct.), aff'd as modified, 42 App. Div. 2d 544, 345 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1973); Palmer v. Schonhorn
Enterprises, Inc., 96 N.J. Super. 72,232 A.2d 458 (1967). Both cases involved unauthorized use of
biographical information about the plaintiffs in games sold commercially.
72 E.g., Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (film characters
created by Laurel and Hardy); Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 58 App. Div. 2d 620,
396 N.Y.S.2d 661 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (professional personality of Guy Lombardo as "Mr. New Year's
Eve").
13 E.g.., Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1956); Gieseking
v. Urania Records, Inc., 17 Misc. 2d 1034, 155 N.Y.S.2d 171 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
74 433 U.S. at 573. See note 68 supra and accompanying text.
45 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTS § 6521 and Comments (1977); Prosser, supra note 55, at
408; Note, The Right of Publicity - Protection For Public Figures and Celebrities, 42 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 527 (1976). See Martin v. F.I.Y. Theatre Co., 10 Ohio Op. 3 3 8 (C.P. Cuyahoga County
1938).
76 Nelson v. Times, 373 A.2d 1221 (Me. 1977).
77 Young v. That Was The Week That Was, 312 F. Supp. 1337 (N.D. Ohio 1969), aff'd, 423 F.2d
265 (6th Cir. 1970).
A cause of action for invasion of the right of privacy has been created by statute.in six states.
The Oklahoma, Virginia, and Utah statutes allow the cause of action for invasion of privacy to
descend. See note 91 infra.
7 Factors, Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co., 444 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Price v. Hal
Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp.
1277 (D.C. Minn. 1970); Hogan v. A. S. Barnes & Co., 114 U.S.P.Q. 314 (C.P. Philadelphia County
Pa. 1957). See Nimmer, supra note 1; Gordon, supra note 53; E. KlrrNER & J. LAiR, supra note
51, at 459.
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Rights in intangible property are created by the investment of time, effort,
skill and money.79 As the owner of a property interest in his name, likeness,
or performance, each individual may control its use by others for private or
commercial benefit.80 The right of a performer in his performance has long
been recognized as a property right at common law." A right of publicity
may be assigned in whole or in part. 2 As a common-law property right, the
right of publicity may be inherited upon the death of the person whose efforts
created the publicity values, even in the absence of statute.8 3 The Supreme
Even judges and commentators who classify appropriation as part of the right of privacy
recognize that a property right is protected. Palmer v. Schonhorn Enterprises, Inc., 96 N.J.
Super. 72, 232 A.2d 458 (1967); Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th
Cir. 1974); Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Urban Sys., Inc., 72 Misc. 2d 788,340 N.Y.S.2d 144 (Sup.
Ct.), aff'd as modified, 42 App. Div. 2d 544, 345 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1973); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 652C, Comment a (1977); F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 56, at § 9.5.
Contra, I A. HANSON, LIBEL AND RELATED TORTS § 247 (1969). Hanson recognizes the problem
involved in attempting to treat a cause of action for appropriation which is a remedy for
pecuniary loss, as part of an action for privacy, which is a remedy for hurt feelings, but his solution
is to deny that appropriation protects a property right.
Bloustein, on the other hand, denies not only that the right of publicity is a property right, but
that such a right exists at all. "The so-called 'right to publicity' is merely a name for the price for
which some men can sell their right to maintain their privacy." Bloustein, supra note 55 at 989.
In Miller v. Universal Pictures Co., 18 Misc. 2d626,188 N.Y.S. 2d386 (Sup. Ct. 1959), rev'don
other grounds, 10 N.Y.2d 972, 224 N.Y.S.2d 662 (1961), Glenn Miller's widow was held to have a
property right in the unique quality of her late husband's musical performances. But in Miller v.
Commissioner, 299 F.2d 706 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 923 (1962), the Second Circuit held
that the exclusive right to make a film about the late Glen Miller, which his widow sold to a film
studio, was not a property right for tax purposes, and that the money she received for the sale of
the right was thus ordinary income rather than capital gains.
79 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 34 (1945); International News Serv. v.
Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 238 (1918). See Note, Intellectual Property - - Performer's
Style, 52 DEN. L.J. 561,585 (1975); Treece, Commercial Exploitation of Names, Likenesses, and
Personal Histories, 51 TEX. L. REV. 637, 647 (1973).
The performer's interest in his performance is a property right in intangible property. Brown
defines intangible property as follows:
In its broader sense the word "property" includes all rights which are of val-
ue . . . . [Miany rights do not thus concern specific tangible things but consist of
claims against third persons which, since they maybe enforced by action, and, if the law
permits, be assigned for a price, are of value and thus entitled to be termed
property ...
R: BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 1.7 (3d ed. 1975).
80 Nimmer, supra note 1, at 216. The right to control the use others make of the commercial
value of one's name or likeness is the essence of the right of publicity. Price v. Hal Roach Studies,
Inc., 400 F. Snpp. 836,846-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277,1282-
83 (D. Minn. 1970).
11 Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1938); Uproar
Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 358 (D. Mass. 1934), modified on other grounds, 81
F.2d 373 (1st Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 670 (1936); Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station,
Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 194 A. 631 (1937); Twentieth Century Sporting Club, Inc. v. Transradio Press
Serv., Inc., 165 Misc. 71, 300 N.Y.S. 159 (Sup. Ct. 1937). See also cases cited in note 73 supra.
82 Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1969); Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps
Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953). See Gordon, supra
note 53 at 611.
s3 Factors, Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co., 444 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Price v. Hal
Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach,
Inc., 58 App. Div. 2d 620, 396 N.Y.S.2d (1977); Miller v. Universal Pictures Co., 18 Misc. 2d 626,
188 N.Y.S.2d 386 (Sup. Ct. 1959), rev'd on other grounds, 10 N.Y.2d 972,224 N.Y.S.2d 662 (1961).
There are conflicting decisions on whether a cause of action for the right of publicity
descends. In Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 172 U.S.P.Q. 541 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. County 1972),
rev'd, 70 Cal. App. 3d 552, 139 Cal. Rptr. 35 (Ct. App. 1977), the California Court of Appeals
1977]
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Court recognized that the right of publicity has much more in common with
other forms of intellectual property, such as copyright and patent, than with
the right of privacy. 4
Additional distinctions can be made between privacy and publicity. An
invasion of privacy must be highly offensive to a reasonable person to be
actionable, 5 so that a claim of invasion of privacy always involves hurt
feelings and emotional distress on the part of the plaintiff. In contrast,
offensiveness is not an element of a publicity action.8 6 The right of publicity
does not protect the plaintiff's hurt feelings because the basis of the complaint
is proprietary rather than emotional.8 7 Publicity is the very thing that most
performers seek, so they are not ordinarily offended by receiving more.
What such a plaintiff really wants, as the Haelan court pointed out, is to
control the publicity he receives.88
The measure of damages for an invasion of privacy is the harm done to the
plaintiff, which may include compensation for the injury to his interest in
reversed a widely cited lower court decision that Bela Lugosi had a property right in the manner
of his portrayal of Count Dracula and that this property right descended to his heirs. The
appellate court refused to characterize the right to exploit one's name and likeness as either a
property right or as a cause of action in tort. Regardless of what it is labeled, the court said the
right is a personal one which does not descend, it must be exercised by the artist during his
lifetime. 139 Cal. Rptr. at 38-40. In characterizing Lugosi's right of exploitation as a personal
right, the court equated it with the appropriation form of invasion of privacy, which it consid-
ered to protect an assignable right, but not an inheritable one. Id. at 38, 40.
It seems inconsistent to treat the right of publicity as a property right for assignability
purposes, but not for purposes of descent. In Price, the court took a view opposite to that in
Lugosi. The Price court held that the right of publicity is a property right which is "clearly
separable" from the right of privacy. 400 F. Supp. at 843. Unlike the right of privacy, the right
of publicity does not terminate upon death, so that plaintiffs, the widows of Laurel and Hardy,
could maintain an action for unauthorized commercial exploitation of the characters created by
their late husbands. The court also stated that the decedents' rights of publicity descended even
though Laurel and Hardy did not exercise these rights during their lifetimes. The court pointed
out that the concept of waiver, whether by non-use or otherwise, is applicable only to the right of
privacy, not to the right of publicity. Id. at 846.
The most recent case on this point is Factors, which followed the reasoning in Price and held
that singer Elvis Presley's right of publicity was a property right which descended at his death to
his assignees. The Factors court refused to follow the Lugosi decision because in 1977 that case
was accepted for hearing by the California Supreme Court (docket no. LA-30824), a procedural
step which renders the intermediate appellate opinion a nullity, having no force as either a
judgment or as a statement of legal principle. Factors, Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co., 444 F.
Supp. 279, 284 n. 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). The California Supreme Court may, however, consider the
Lugosi opinion as a brief on the legal questions involved. See Knouse v. Nimocks, 8 Cal. 2d 482,
66 P.2d 438 (1937).
84 433 U.S. at 576.
It has been suggested that the future development of the right of publicity should be by
analogy to copyright law because copyright and publicity are both intangible property rights.
The use of "pure" privacy doctrine and defamation as models for the right of publicity, it is
argued. has created "inapposite confusion." See22U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1103(1975). But see Note,
The Right of Publicity, supra note 75, at 548, which rejects the copyright analogy while still
recognizing the right of publicity as a property right.
85 RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF ToRTs § 652B, 652D, 652E (1977). An invasion of privacy must
also be unreasonable to be actionable. Id.
Il Nimmer, supra note 1, at 206-209. The requirement of offensiveness is not applied to
appropriation even when appropriation is classified as part of the right of privacy. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977).
87 Nimmer, supra note 1, at 206-09. See note 68 supra and accompanying text.
88 Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 816 (1953).
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privacy and for mental distress, as well as special and punitiv6 damages.8 9 In
a publicity action damages are also measured by the harm to the plaintiff, but
in addition there is usually unjust enrichment of the defendant, who has
diverted profits from the plaintiff by using plaintiff's name, likeness, or
performance for commercial or advertising purposes. Damages in a publici-
ty action may therefore be measured either by the extent of unjust enrichment
or non-pecuniary benefit to the defendant, or by the plaintiff's financial loss or
impairment of his publicity values.90 Courts and commentators disagree
over whether the plaintiff in a right of publicity case must prove that the
defendant appropriated his publicity rights for commercial purposes and thus
was unjustly enriched.91 The better view, adopted by both the Ohio and
89 E. KINTNER & J. LAHR, supra note 51, at455; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652H (1977);
W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 815 (4th ed. 1971). For a fuller discussion of damages for
invasion of privacy, see Nimmer, supra note 1, at 208-09.
10 E. KINTNER & J. LAHR, supra note 51, at 459; Note, The Right of Publicity, supra note 75, at
533. See authorities cited in note 89 supra.
Factors to be considered in determining the amount of damages is a publicity case involving a
professional performer include the fame of the plaintiff, the market value of his publicity rights
(how much he could have or has assigned them for), and what share of plaintiff's profits has been
diverted to the defendant by commercial exploitation. Gordon, supra note 53, at 611.
The Zacchini dissent took the position that misappropriation of publicity must involve
commercial use by the defendant. The dissent implied that it would further require a plaintiff to
prove that the defendant was unjustly enriched, in order to win damages. 433 U.S. at 580 n.2.
(Powell, J., dissenting) The majority, while recognizing that an invasion of publicity generally
involves unjust enrichment, Id. at 576 accepted a measure of damages based only on harm to the
plaintiff. Id. at 575. The majority position represents the better view because the right of
publicity can be invaded without commercial use and without unjust enrichment of the
defendant. See notes 91-93 and accompanying text infra.
Opinions differ on whether ordinary persons who are not celebrities have a right of publicity.
Under one view, everyone has a right of publicity, but the damages a person can claim for
invasion of his right depend on the value of the publicity appropriated, which in turn depends
upon the degree of fame of the plaintiff. Nimmer, supra note 1, at 217; Note, The Right of
Publicity: A Doctrinal Innovation, 62 YALE L. J. 1123, 1129 (1953). Under the contrary view,
everyone has a property interest in his name and likeness, but when a private individual sues for
commercial appropriation of his name or picture, his injury is typically the mental one of
embarrassment and hurt feelings. The measure of damages for non-celebrities should thus be
limited to compensation for hurt feelings, while celebrities, whose publicity interest is purely
proprietary, should be permitted to recover for unjust enrichment. Note, The Right of Publicity,
supra note 75, at 532-33.
The best course of action would be to allow non-celebrity plaintiffs to offer proof of the
pecuniary value, if any, of their names and likenesses under property theory, since the right of
publicity is purely a property right, with no element of hurt feelings. If such plaintiffs also have a
claim for hurt feelings, that claim should be clearly labeled as one for invasion of privacy or
infliction of emotional distress.
In addition to damages, injunctive relief may also be available for appropriation of
professional property. E.g., Factors, Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co., 444 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y.
1977); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D.C. Minn. 1970); Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v.
KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1938); Edison v. Edison Polyform Mfg. Co., 73
N.J. Eq. 136,67 A. 392 (1907). Where the right of publicity has been invaded by the news media,
an injunction will be more difficult to obtain because an injunction raises the possibility of
unconstitutional prior restraint on the press. D. DoBBs, REMEDIES § 7.4 (1973); A. HANSON, supra
note 78 at 264. Cf. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (injunction places unconstitutional
prior restraint on press).
91 Six states have statutes which provide a cause of action for invasion of privacy, including
appropriation. All require a showing that defendant used plaintiff's name or picture "for
advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade." N.Y. Civ. RIGHrs LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney
1976); CAL. CIVIL CODE § 3344 (West Supp. 1977); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 214, § 3A (West
Supp. 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 839.1-839.3 (WestSupp. 1976); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-4-8
(1953); VA. CODE § 8-650 (1957). The Massachusetts statute provides a separate section, 1B,
1977]
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United States Supreme Courts, is that commercial use is not a necessary
element of a publicity action, 92 although most appropriation cases do, in fact,
involve commercial use of the plaintiff's identity for the defendant's profit.
The loss of an individual's control over his property which results from an
invasion of his right of publicity is the same regardless of the use defendant
makes of that property.93 For example, an orchestra's right of publicity may
be violated by unauthorized taping of a concert for use in making and selling
phonograph records for profit, or by unauthorized taping by a college
professor of music for non-commercial use in the classroom, or by an
unauthorized broadcast of the concert as part of a television news documen-
tary.
In the Zacchini situation, the damage sustained by the petitioner could be
measured by the amount he was paid by the fair promoters for one perfor-
mance, since only one entire performance was appropriated. Damages
could also be allowed for any detrimental effect on Zacchini's earnings
following the broadcast, if he could prove that he was forced to accept a
lower fee for later bookings. If Zacchini's agreement with the fair's promo-
ters provided that he was to receive a percentage of the gate receipts, he
would have to prove that attendance at his performances declined measura-
bly as the result of the broadcast in order to recover damages. Unjust
enrichment of the respondent television station would not be an element of
damages in this case, for even if Zacchini argued that WEWS broadcast his
act in order to increase its ratings,94 the relationship between the broadcast
and the station's profits would be entirely speculative.
One area in which the confusion between privacy and publicity has been
most evident is in the question of applicability of the defense of waiver of the
right. 95 Plaintiffs in privacy actions who are public figures have been held to
have involuntarily waived their right of privacy with regard to those activities
which bring them into the public eye, and even with regard to some aspects of
covering Prosser's three suggested types of privacy actions other than appropriation.
Commercial use is not a prerequisite to an action under section lB. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch.
214 § 1B (West Supp. 1976).
Both Prosser and the Restatement agree that commercial use is not required in an
appropriation action in states without privacy statutes, where appropriation exists only as a part
of the common law. Prosser, Privacy, supra note 55, at 405; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs §
652C, Comment b (1977).
Because the New York privacy statute requires commercial use, New York courts have
generated misunderstanding by imposing the commercial use requirement on cases in which the
claim was invasion of publicity rather than privacy. E.g., Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random
House, Inc., 58 Misc. 2d 1,294 N.Y.S.2d 122 (Sup. Ct. 1968), aff'd mere., 32 App. Div. 2d 892,301
N.Y.S.2d 948 (1969); Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 444,299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup.
Ct. 1968). However, New York courts have distinguished the common law interests of
performers in their public personalities and performances from the interests protected by the
state's statutory right of privacy. Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 58 App. Div. 2d
620, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661 (1977); Gieseking v. Urania Records, Inc., 17 Misc. 2d 1034, 155 N.Y.S.2d
171 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
9'2 The dissent in the United States Supreme Court's opinion did require a showing of
commercial use. See note 90 supra.
" See note 80 supra and accompanying text.
91 Television stations do present items of entertainment on their news programs for the
purpose of increasing their ratings and profits. See notes 170-76 infra and accompanying text.
11 Consent is also a complete defense to claims of invasion of publicity and invasion of
privacy. Sharman v. C. Schmidt & Sons, 216 F. Supp. 401 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
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their private lives.9 Some performers who sought redress under privacy
theory for invasion of their publicity rights were denied recovery by courts
which reasoned, as did the Zacchini dissent, that one who seeks publicity
cannot complain when he gets more of the very thing he has been seeking.
97
But this reasoning makes the defense of waiver inapplicable to the right of
publicity.9" A performer cannot lose the right to prevent unauthorized use of
his performance by the act of performing in public, for it is the act of
performing itself which creates the publicity value inherent in the perfor-
mance. 9 Similarly, the fact of being a celebrity or public figure should not
cause an individual to lose the right to protect the publicity value of his name
or likeness. That value is enhanced by public recognition of celebrity status,
so that those with the greatest fame are most in need of legal protection of
their publicity rights.
B. Confusion Remains After Zacchini
The Zacchini opinion does little to clarify the distinctions between
publicity and privacy which have been identified in this Note and in other
writings on the subject. Although the Supreme Court was bound to follow
Ohio's formulation of the tort, the confusion may be perpetuated in future
96 E.g., Galella v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'das modified, 487 F.2d 986 (2d
Cir. 1973); O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1942). See generally Annot., 57
A.L.R.3d 16 (1974).
Harper and James wrote that the use of a waiver theory is misleading, and that the justification
for invasion of privacy should be called "newsworthiness" instead. F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra
note 56, at 687-88. But Nimmer supports the distinction between waiver and news privilege.
Nimmer, supra note 1, at 216-17. The distinction turns on whether a newsworthy individual has
a right of privacy that he can waive or whether no right of privacy exists as to the celebrity. For
the Restatement view, see note 146 infra.
17 In Gautier v. Pro-Football Inc., 278 App. Div. 431, 106 N.Y.S.2d 553, aff'd, 304 N.Y. 354, 107
N.E.2d 485 (1952), plaintiff was an animal trainer who performed his act during halftime of a
televised professional football game. Plaintiff's act was also televised over his objection.
Gautier was denied recovery under the New York privacy statute, in part because the court felt
that he had waived his right of privacy. "[H]e did become a part of the spectacle as a whole
by . . .voluntarily occupying the very center of attraction for several minutes. Under these
circumstances, it can hardly be said that his right of privacy was invaded." 304 N.Y. at 306, 107
N.E.2d at 489. Judge Desmond, concurring, noted that plaintiff's real complaint was not that his
privacy had been invaded, but that he was not paid for the televising of his performance. 304
N.Y. at 361-62, 107 N.E.2d at 489-90. See also O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.
1942); Man v. Warner Bros., 317 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Smith v. Doss, 251 Ala. 250,37 So. 2d
118 (1948); Martin v. F.I.Y. Theatre Co., 10 Ohio Op. 338 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1938).
" Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277,1282-83 (D.C. Minn. 1970); Note, The Right of
Publicity: A Doctrinal Innovation, 62 YALE L.J. 1123,1127-28 (1953); Nimmer, supra note 1, at 216.
11 Uproar Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 358 (D. Mass. 1934), modified on other
grounds, 81 F.2d 373 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 670 (1936) (radio announcer's property right
in name and performances not lost by performing); Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting
Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1956) (boxer's right to control later television use of film of his fights);
Sharkey v. National Broadcasting Co., 93 F. Supp. 986 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (boxer's right to pecuniary
value of film of his fight shown on television); Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa.
433, 194 A. 631 (1937) (orchestra's right in performances); Miller v. Universal Pictures Co., 18
Misc. 2d 626, 188 N.Y.S.2d 386 (Sup. Ct. 1959), rev'd on other grounds, 10 N.Y.2d 972, 224
N.Y.S.2d 662 (1961) (right in the "Glenn Miller sound"); Gieseking v. Urania Records, Inc., 17
Misc. 2d 1034, 155 N.Y.S.2d 171 (Sup. Ct. 1956) (pianist's right in his performance).
A performer has the right to capitalize on the news value of his performance, and this right is
not lost when the performer gives information about the performance to the press. Pittsburgh
Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1938).
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cases by other state courts looking to the Zacchini opinion for guidance. The
result of viewing publicity as a part of the right of privacy may be to deny
recovery to future plaintiffs for pecuniary, non-emotional harms which are
not protected by the right of privacy. 00
The Supreme Court realized that appropriation of an entertainer's entire
performance is an invasion of his right of publicity, but did not fully explain
why the taking of an entire performance must be distinguished from other
types of appropriations. The difference is that individuals have dual privacy
and publicity interests in their names, likenesses, and personal histories, 10 but
only a publicity interest in their performances. Public figures, as well as
private individuals, may wish to keep their names, faces, and details of their
lives from the public some of the time,'0 2 yet they may also capitalize on the
pecuniary value of their names and likenesses and may prevent their unautho-
rized use, such as in advertising.10 3 An entertainer's performance, on the
other hand, always occurs before the public and has no privacy aspect.
There exists only the property right in performance, for performance is the
entertainer's means of livelihood and the very thing which creates the
publicity value in his name and likeness. The Supreme Court correctly found
no privilege to appropriate a performance because performances do not
embody, any of the privacy interests which the press may be privileged to
invade.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE AND THE
RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
The Ohio Supreme Court applied the first amendment privilege first
developed in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 0 4 to the facts of the Zacchini
case by reasoning erroneously that the right of publicity is part of the right of
privacy. In Time, Inc. v. Hill,10 5 the constitutional privilege had been applied
to a conflict between freedom of the press and the right of privacy. The Ohio
court concluded, therefore, that the privilege should also apply to conflicts
between freedom of the press and the right of publicity. The United States
Supreme Court found to the contrary that the media's first amendment rights
are outweighed by the right of publicity when a performer's entire act has
been appropriated. 0 6  The development of the constitutional privilege
supports the Court in this conclusion, and suggests that the Zacchini decision
does not deprive the news media of adequate rights to enable it to fulfill its
informing function with respect to entertainer's performances and other
activities.
100 See authorities cited in note 51 supra.
101 Treece, supra note 79, at 652.
102 E.g., Galella v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd as modified, 487 F.2d 986
(2d Cir. 1973); Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711
(1940).
103 E.g., Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Edison v. Edison Polyform
Mfg. Co., 73 N.J. Eq. 136, 67 A. 392 (1907).
104 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See text accompanying note 107 infra.
105 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
100 The Court's restriction on the rights of the news media was narrowly limited to situations
involving appropriation of a performer's entire act. The Court indicated that its holding would
not necessarily apply to other instances of appropriation. 433 U.S. at 573 n.10.
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A. Constitutional Privilege: Development and Rationale
The constitutional privilege was first announced in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, a case involving defamation of a Montgomery, Alabama city official.
The Supreme Court held that states may not impose liability on the press for
the publication of defamatory statements concerning the official acts of a
public official, except upon a showing that the statements were knowingly
false or were made with reckless disregard of whether or not they were
false. 107 This constitutional "actual malice" standard also applies to public
figures other than government officials' 08 In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.1 9
the Court held that the states may impose any standard of liability other than
strict liability for the publication of defamatory statements concerning a
private individual.
The protection of the press against liability for false reports is the purpose
of the constitutional privilege. The press privilege developed within the
context of cases involving defamation and the false light type of invasion of
privacy. Both defamation and false light involve publication of falsehoods
about the plaintiff," 0 while publicity, as the Court pointed out, does not, The
Supreme Court has once before declined to extend the constitutional privi-
lege to a news report containing true facts about the plaintiff, finding instead
that the common law news reporting privilege was applicable."'
The Supreme Court has often recognized the need for protecting false
107 376 U.S. at 279-80.
10' Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (decided with Associated Press v.
Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). There was no clear majority in Curtis. The plurality opinion,
signed by four justices, applied a gross negligence standard to the reporting process. Id. at 155.
Five justices concurred as to the companion case, and the concurring opinion espoused the New
York Times standard. Id. at 162-74. As a result, Curtis has been considered to stand for the
proposition that the New York Times standard applies to public figures. See Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343 (1974).
1o 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
"0 Although both false light and defamation protect the plaintiff's interest in reputation, proof
of false light invasion of privacy does not require a showing of actual injury to plaintiff's reputation,
as does defamation. Proof of false light requires only a showing that the publication is offensive
to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities. In addition, proof of actual falsity is not required
in false light cases. HASTINGS supra note 49, at 590-91; Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to
Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV.
935, 958 (1968). Because the required proof in a false light invasion of privacy action is less
stringent than that required in defamation, many actions are now being brought under the false
light theory rather than defamation. Wade predicts that the tort of invasion of privacy will
eventually supplant defamation entirely. See Wade, supra note 67, at 1121.
In addition to protecting the plaintiff's interest in reputation, false light privacy and
defamation actions share another characteristic. The Second Restatement finds that the absolute
and conditional privileges applicable to defamation also excuse invasions of the right of privacy.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 652F, 652G (1977).
1 In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1965) the plaintiff sued for invasion of
privacy by public disclosure of a true fact, the name of his daughter who had been raped and
murdered. Her name was obtained by a reporter from public court records during the trial of
her murderer. The Court held the television station to be privileged on the basis of the common
law privilege to report matters of public record connected with judicial proceedings. The New
York Times constitutional privilege was not applied in Cox because the common law privilege
was applicable.
The common law "actual malice" standard, rather than the New York Times standard, was
applied in a false light invasion of privacy case, Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S.
245 (1974). Although the Supreme Court did not discuss common law privileges in Zacchini,
some are applicable to this type of situation. See notes 142-63 infra and accompanying text.19Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1977
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
news reports attributable to negligence on the part of the reporter. For such
cases the protection of first amendment rights has been found to outweigh the
state interest in protecting plaintiffs from injury to their reputations and
emotional distress." 2 The application of "definitional balancing" in constitu-
tional privilege cases has resulted in the Court's formulation of the "actual
malice" standard, a single rule applicable to all publications of falsehood,
whether defamatory or non-defamatory in nature." 3 The Court stated in
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,"4 and re-emphasized later," 5 that the
rationale for protecting certain false and defamatory speech is to reinforce the
central thrust of the first amendment, which is that free speech, especially
criticism of the government and public officials, is essential to democracy." 6
The Court explained in New York Times: "[W]e consider this case against
the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that
112 433 U.S. at 573.
113 Nimmer, Times to Time, supra note 110, at 942. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 343-44 (1971).
The Court has developed the constitutional privilege by balancing the plaintiff's interest in
reputation or hurt feelings against free speech interests. Nimmer, Times to Time, supra, passim.
See. e.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring);
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 399-400 (1967) (Black, J., concurring); Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. at 348.
In addition to definitional balancing, the Court has utilized "ad hoc" balancing in some first
amendment cases. The assumption underlying definitional balancing is that most of the
necessary balancing of competing interests took place during the drafting and adoption of the
first amendment, and that the role of courts today is merely to define the limits of first amendment
rights. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963);
Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962). The ad hoc balancing
method, used in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 49-50 (1971), weights the
competing interests on a case-by-case basis. Ad hoc balancing has been criticized for providing
no guidelines to indicate in future situations that speech which is constitutionally protected.
Consequently, critics add, the possibility exists of an unconstitutional chilling effect on some
future speech because of doubt as to its status as privileged speech. Nimmer, supra at 939-41;
Emerson, supra; Frantz, supra. The Supreme Court explicitly rejected the ad hoc balancing of
Rosenbloom in cases decided later. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343-44; Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S.
448, 456 (1976).
The use of balancing in constitutional privilege cases was opposed by Justices Black and
Douglas, who expressed the "absolutist" view of the first amendment. They felt that no restraints
whatsoever should be placed on the press, and that to allow states to enforce a cause of action for
defamation or invasion of privacy is such a restraint. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 293-97 (1964) (Black & Douglas, J.J., concurring); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. at 398-402
(1967) (Black & Douglas, J.J., concurring).
The absolutist view has not received wide judicial support. Most courts recognize that first
amendment rights are not absolute and must sometimes yield to competing interests. E.g.,Smith
v. California, 361 U.S. 147,155 (1959); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484,488 (1957). The
news media are not constitutionally immune from liability for all torts committed during the
course of news gathering. Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971); Galella v.
Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd as modified, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973). Cf.
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (news media not constitutionally immune by
virtue of the first amendment). The Constitution does not prevent courts from finding that the
press is liable for invading privacy and property rights. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642,
644-45 (1951); Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Urban Sys., Inc., 72 Misc. 2d 788,345 N.Y.S.2d 144
(Sup. Ct.), afi'd as modified, 42 App. Div. 2d 544, 345 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1973).
Il4 376 U.S. at 273-78.
115 E.g., Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966).
116 Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on the Central Meaning of the First
Amendment, 1964 SuP. CT. REV. 191.
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it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
attacks on government and public officials.""' 7  In the New York Times
decision the Court explained its emphasis on criticism of government as the
root of first amendment rights by discussing the Sedition Act of 1798. That
law, which Congress allowed to expire after three years, imposed criminal
penalties for publication of defamatory falsehoods about a public official."'
Although the Sedition Act was not declared unconstitutional duringthe time
it was in effect, the New York Times Court felt that the law had impermissibly
abridged the most fundamental first amendment rights. The New York
Times rules gave ordinary citizens a privilege, similar to that enjoyed by
public officials, to defame during the course of democratic debate, by
requiring a showing of actual malice before one can be held for defamatory
criticism of a public official." 9
In Time, the New York Times rule was extended to cover erroneous
statements made about private individuals during the course of "news-
worthy" speech, which was broadly defined to include more than just political
discussion. 20 The Court appeared to retreat from this broad definition,
however, in Gertz and Firestone. These cases defined matters of public
interest more narrowly. 12' The Gertz opinion emphasized the importance of
the distinction between public figures and private individuals in the applica-
11 376 U.S. at 270-71.
11 376 U.S. at 273-78. The Act of July 14,1798, ch. 74, § 2,1 Stat. 596 (expired 1801), made it a
crime, punishable by a $2,000 fine and two years in prison to:
write, print, utter, or publish . . . any false, scandalous and malicious writing or
writings against the government of the United States, or . . . the Congress . .. or the
President . . . with intent to defame . .. or to bring them . . . into contempt or
disrepute; or to excite against them . . . the hatred of the good people of the United
States ....
119 Kalven, supra note 116, at 203-204. In Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959), which was cited
in New York Times, the Court held that public officials have an absolute privilege to utter
defamatory falsehoods during the course of their official conduct because false speech is a
necessary concomitant of free debate on public issues.
120 The guarantees for speech and press are not the preserve of political expression or
comment upon public affairs, essential as those are to healthy government. One need
only pick up any newspaper or magazine to comprehend the vast range of published
matter which exposes persons to public view, both private citizens and public
officials .... Freedom of discussion . . . must embrace all issues about which
information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the
exigencies of their period."
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374,388 (1967) (quoting from Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102
(1940)). Thus, the avoidance of seditious libel, though it is the central purpose of the first
amendment, is not its only purpose. Kalven, supra note 49, at 282.
121 For an explanation of status and public interest analysis used in the constitutional privilege
cases, see note 49 supra.
The Court held in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971), that the New York
Times standard of knowing or reckless falsity may be applied to a libel action brought by a
private individual for a defamatory falsehood published in a news report about his involvement
in a matter of public or general interest. Rosenbloom defined matters of public interest broadly,
as did Time, to include more than political discussion. "[T]he First Amendment extends to
myriad matters of public interest." 403 U.S., at 42.
Gertz and Firestone not only rejected the use of newsworthiness as a guide for application of
the actual malice standard, see note 49 supra, but those cases also criticized the broad scope
Rosenbloom gave to the term "matter of public interest." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 346 (1974); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454 (1976). Gertz described issues of
general interest as those which are "relevant to self-government." 418 U.S. at 346.
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tion of the constitutional privilege, noting that the state's interest in protecting
false speech is greater with respect to certain plaintifts.122 Public figures as
defined in Gertz are of two kinds - those who are so powerful and influential
that they "are deemed public figures for all purposes," and more commonly,
those who "have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public
controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved."las
Firestone narrowly defined the types of issues whose participants become
public figures. The divorce of Mrs. Firestone, a prominent socialite who had
received publicity in the past, was held not to be the sort of public controversy
referred to in Gertz, "even though the marital difficulties of extremely wealthy
individuals may be of some interest to the reading public."124 The Court ap-
peared in Firestone to return to its original emphasis on criticism of govern-
ment as the central meaning of the first amendment by limiting the area of
public debate within which falsehoods will be protected to "communications
necessary to self-governance," 125 rather than including mere entertainment or
titillation of the public.126
The Zacchini dissent impliedly found Hugo Zacchini to be a public figure
within the Gertz test. Justice Powell cited Gertz in support of his statement
that the petitioner had waived his right of publicity by seeking public
attentio).12 7 It is not certain, however, whether Zacchini's act, which is pure
entertainment, should be considered a matter of public interest in light of the
Firestone decision. Gertz and Firestone required a public figure to have
drawn public attention in connection with some issue of importance. 28
Although Zacchini conceded that his human cannonball act had some news
value, he added that it could not be described as "one of the burning issues of
our day."' 29
B. Constitutional Privilege Not Applicable to Publicity
An analysis of why the constitutional privilege is not applicable to the right
122 See note 49, supra.
"I Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974). The Court found that the plaintiff
was not a public figure within this definition. Gertz was an attorney retained by the family of a
murder victim to represent them in civil litigation against the murderer, who was a Chicago
policeman. An article on the murder trial in defendant's magazine, which was an outlet for the
views of the John Birch Society, falsely accused plaintiff of being a "communist-fronter." The
Court noted that none of the prospective jurors had heard of Gertz, although he was active in
community affairs. The Court concluded, "Absent clear evidence of general fame or notoriety in
the community, and pervasive involvement in the affairs of society, an individual should not be
deemed a public personality for all aspects of his life." Id. at 352.
124 Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454 (1976).
in Id. at 471 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
126 Cf. HAsTINGS, supra note 49, at 570 (constitutional privilege may not be applicable to news
stories merely intended to amuse).
127 433 U.S. at 582 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting).
Entertainers have traditionally been considered public figures under common law tort rules
because they ordinarily have some fame and notoriety, and because they voluntarily place
themselves before the public. Stevens, Performing Artists as "Public Figures": The Implications
of Gertz v. Robert Welch, 6 PERFORMING ARTS REV. 3, 7 (1975).
12I See notes 123 & 124 supra and accompanying text.
129 Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 20. Cf. Stevens, supra note 127, at 9-10 (stating that the
narrow Gertz definition of matters of public interest may exclude performers and performances).
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of publicity must go beyond a mere showing that the New York Times type of
balancing cannot be applied where no falsehood has been reported. As the
Zacchini majority realized, an entirely new balance must be struck, for the
interests which compete with first amendment rights in publicity cases are
much different from those involved in defamation and false light invasion of
privacy cases. False light and publicity actions differ in their impact on first
amendment rights, stated the Court, because "[i]n 'false light' cases the only
way to protect the plaintiff involved is to attempt to minimize publication of
the damaging matter, while in 'right of publicity' cases the only question is
who gets to do the publishing.' 130 The competing interests balanced by the
Court in Zacchini were the state's interest in protecting the performer's
economic stake in his performance and the interests of the news media and the
public in free dissemination of information. 3 1 Protecting the performer, the
Court reasoned, rewards and encourages the investment of time, talent, and
expense in the creation of entertainment. No social purpose would be served
by allowing a defendant to enrich himself unjustly by appropriating an entire
performance. In order for an act to have economic value sufficient to enable
a performer to continue to earn a living, the performer must maintain the
"right of exclusive control over the publicity given to his performance; if the
public can see the act for free on television, they will be less willing to pay to
see it at the fair.' '3 2
In comparing the rights protected by the right of publicity and by
copyright, the Court noted that balancing of similar interests has also justified
some limitation on first amendment rights as against copyright ownership.133
The purpose of the copyright and patent laws is "to promote the progress of
science and useful arts' 34 so as to benefit the public. An additional objective
is to provide a financial reward by granting a limited statutory monopoly to
the creator of a copyrightable work or a patentable invention.13 5  Like the
right of publicity, copyright and patent rights are property rights.13 6 As such,
130 433 U.S. at 573.
131 433 U.S. at 576, 578.
132 433 U.S. at 575. The Court hypothesized that the televising of Zacchini's act may have
increased its value by stimulating more people to come to see him perform, in which case he
would not have been damaged and could not have recovered. If the analogy with copyright law
is followed, however, the very use of Zacchini's act without his consent, regardless of its effect on
the aqt's value, caused injury to his interest in sole control over the publicity given to the act, and
should entitle him to recover damages. See note 162 infra.
13 433 U.S. at 575.
134 U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (the "copyright clause"). See Washingtonian Publishing Co. v.
Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 36 (1939) (purpose of copyright laws is to encourage production of literary
works); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964) (purpose of patent laws is to
encourage invention). For a fuller discussion of the Sears case, see note 34 supra and
accompanying text.
13- Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201,219 (1954); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S.
131,158 (1948); Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 543-44 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 822 (1964).
A third reason for the granting of a limited monopoly under the copyright laws is to protect the
creator's interest in privacy by giving him the right to choose whether or not to publish his work.
Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge The First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and
Press?, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1180, 1186, (1970).
136 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,478,497 (1974); Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel.
Co., 91 F.2d 484, 487 (9th Cir. 1937).
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the owner has the right to control the sale or use of his work and may grant an
exclusive license for its reproduction. 137 Although the copyright laws allow
an author to limit dissemination of his work, this limitation does not abridge
first amendment rights because the granting of a limited exclusive license is
deemed necessary to stimulate creative activity, which ultimately benefits
society.138  One court explained, "[W]e fail to see as any protected first
amendment right a privilege to usurp the benefits of the creative and artistic
talent, technical skills, and investment necessary to produce a . . .perfor-
mance."'139 Even though a celebrity's name, likeness, or live performance
probably is not copyrightable, 14 0 the creative effort and investment which
produce publicity values are also entitled to protection against being "freely
plundered under the banner of the first amendment."'141
C. Reconciling the First Amendment and Right of Publicity
Preventing the news media from appropriating publicity values during the
course of news reporting does not short-change the public in its access to
information. As in the case with copyright, there is an increased likelihood of
creation of a greater number and wider variety of performances for the
public's enjoyment when performers are protected. In addition, the news
media may continue to work within the traditional common law news
131 Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973).
Likewise, the owner of a copyright or patent may prevent others from using the protected
work or invention. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225,229 (1964) (patent); Leon v.
Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484, 487 (9th Cir. 1937) (copyright).
138 Although granting authors and creators the right to limit dissemination of their works does
abridge free speech to some extent, there is no real conflict between the copyright clause and the
first amendment. The protection provided by the copyright clause represents a balance between
the creator's rights in his work and the public's first amendment right to have access to
information. Nimmer, supra note 135, Sobel, Copyright and the First Amendment: A Gathering
Storm?, 19 ASCAP CoPYRIcr L. SYMP. 43 (1971). First amendment rights do "not include the
wholesale appropriation of another's literary, artistic and musical works. In the balance must be
weighed . . . the need to protect those of ability who justifiably seek compensation for their
ingenuity and labor." Robert Stigwood Group Ltd. v. O'Reilly, 346 F. Supp. 376,383 (D. Conn.
1972).
Copyright protects the expression of an idea, rather than the idea itself. Mazer v. Stein, 347
U.S. 201, 217 (1954); Musto v. Meyer, 434 F. Supp. 32, 34-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). The expression of
an idea is the particular selection and arrangement of the idea used by a creator, or the specific
form of the expression. 1 M. NiMMER, N mEaR ON CoPRucIrr § 9.222 (rev. ed. 1976). Nimmer
explains that the widely-recognized idea/expression dichotomy in copyright law indicates the
balance that exists between copyright and the first amendment, since an individual is free to
express his own ideas so long as he does not copy the expressions of others. Nimmer, supra note
135, at 1189-92. An individual may independently create a work identical to a copyrighted work
without being liable for infringement. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954). See generally
Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 102(b), 90 Stat. 2545 (1976) (effective January 1, 1978).
139 United States v. Bodin, 375 F. Supp. 1265, 1267 (W.D. Okla. 1974).
140 The copyright laws protect only the "writings" of an author. Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 102(a),
90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (effective January 1, 1978) (amending 17 U.S.C. § 4 (1970)). The term
writings has been construed to mean that a copyrightable work must be in some tangible form,
unlike a live performance. 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 9.222 at 28.16 n. 172 (rev. ed.
1976). The requirement of fixation in tangible form which was retained under the new copyright
law was intended to subject performances to protection only under state law. H.R. REP. No.94-
1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1976).
141 Nimmer, supra note 110, at 957-58.
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privilege and privilege of fair comment in reporting on the public activities
and performances of entertainers.
The press has always been privileged at common law to publish news
reports on matters of public interest, even though such a report may invade
matters otherwise considered to be private. 142  This privilege protects
truthful reports, 43 and is buttressed by the New York Times privilege which
protects only false reports. The reporting privilege is extremely broad
because the courts have felt constrained by the first amendment to allow the
press to decide for itself what is a matter of public interest. 4 4 As a result,
news has been defined to include items of educational interest and of pure
entertainment, in addition to the usual reporting on government and public
officials, crime, and current events.
45
While the news reporting privilege permits the press to invade an individu-
al's right of privacy, it should not be allowed to permit invasion of the right of
142 In a leading case, Sidis v. F-R Publishing Co., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S.
711 (1940), plaintiff was a well-known child prodigy who sought to live in obscurity in his adult
life. He sued for invasion of privacy when a magazine published a story about his former
achievements and the details of his present life. The court held that his life story remained
newsworthy and that the magazine was privileged to print the story. Accord, Rosemont
Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 58 Misc. 2d 1, 294 N.Y.S.2d 122 (Sup. Ct. 1968), afi'd
mem., 32 App. Div. 2d 892, 301 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1969); Smith v. Doss, 251 Ala. 250, 37 So. 2d 118
(1948); Johnson v. Scripps Publishing Co., 18 Ohio Op. 372 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1940). See
Prosser, supra note 55, at 410-15; Warren & Brandeis, supra note 54, at 214-16.
The common law news privilege includes the privilege to give publicity to matters of
legitimate public concern and the privilege to give publicity to the public activities of persons
who voluntarily place themselves in the public eye. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 652D,
Comments b,d,e,f (1977); Prosser, supra note 55. See also notes 142-47 supra and accompanying
text.
143 See authorities cited in note 142 supra.
144 The judgment of what is newsworthy must remain primarily a function of the
publisher .... Only in cases of flagrant breach of privacy which has not been waived
or obvious exploitation of public curiosity where no legitimate public interest exists
should a court substitute its judgment for that of the publisher.
Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 484 F.2d 150, 156-57 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd on other
grounds, 419 U.S. 245 (1974).
14 E.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (magazine article about new Broadway play);
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948) (article in crime stories magazine); Jenkins v. Dell
Publishing Co., 251 F.2d 447 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 921 (1958) (story in detective
magazine); Man v. Warner Bros., 317 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (musical performance at
Woodstock Festival); Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 304 N.Y. 354, 107 N.E.2d 485 (1952) (animal
training act); Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 444,299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1968)
(comedian's mock Presidential campaign); Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, Inc., 162 Misc. 776, 295 N.Y.S.
382 (Sup. Ct. 1937) (newspaper article about Indian rope trick).
Such a definition of news has been criticized as overboard. The determination of what is
newsworthy enough to justify an invasion of privacy or publicity involves balancing the public's
interest in free dissemination of information against the individual's hurt feelings or property
rights. Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Urban Sys., Inc., 72 Misc. 2d 788,340 N.Y.S.2d 144 (Sup.
Ct.), aff'd as modified, 42 App. Div. 2d 544,345 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1973). See Spiegel, Public Celebrity
v. Scandal Magazine - The Celebrity's Right to Privacy, 30 S. CAL. L. REV. 280,301 (1957). In
balancing freedom of the press against individual rights, the balance may not weigh as heavily for
the press when pure entertainment or feature stories are involved. HASTINGS, supra note 49, at
568-71. Pure entertainment may not be sufficiently newsworthy to justify tortious conduct by the
news media. In addition, the broad common law news privilege allows the press to decide for
itself when it will invade an individual's privacy, and thereby "decimates the tort" of invasion of
privacy. Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law - Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAw &
CoNrrEMp. PstoB. 326, 336 (1966).
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publicity. The right of privacy must give way, or may perhaps be said not to
exist, when the public's interest in obtaining knowledge of the private matter
is greater than the individual's right to be let alone.146 The importance of
promoting creativity and protecting a performer's means of livelihood,
however, outweighs the common law reporting of the press just as these
interests outweigh those of the press in the constitutional privilege context.
The actions of the celebrities in public do have news value and may be
reported by the media, but this news privilege extends only to the privacy
aspect of the person's name, likeness, or personal history. A celebrity whose
picture appears in a newspaper or television news story still retains the right to
sell an exclusive license for the use of his picture in commercial advertising.
The news media may not use an entire performance under the guise of news
privilege because there is no privacy interest in the performance against
which the news privilege could be balanced. 47
The news media may remain within the bounds of fair comment by
reporting about a performance, as opposed to showing the entire perfor-
mance itself. The Supreme Court in Zacchini recognized that the television
station could have "merely reported that petitioner was performing at the fair
and described or commented on his act, with or without showing his picture
on television."1 48  The dissent retorted that limiting television news to
"watered-down verbal reporting, perhaps with an occasional still picture"
would deprive the public of the full news coverage the first amendment is
meant to foster. 4 9 The dissent's fears are groundless, however, because the
news media has traditionally remained within the bounds of fair comment
without adverse effects on first amendment rights. Fair comment is a
qualified privilege to comment upon or to criticize matters of public inte-
rest.150 Like the common law reporting privilege, but unlike the constitution-
141 The Supreme Court in Zacchini interpreted the Second Restatement as permitting
encroachments on the right of privacy by the news media by limiting the reach of the right of
privacy, rather than by creating a privileged invasion. 433 U.S. at 567. See RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF TOR's, § 652C, Comment d; § 652D, Comments b & e (1977).
147 The distinction between invasion of privacy for a news purpose and invasion of publicity
has been recognized by Kintner and Lahr. They state that an individual may not recover under
publicity theory for the use of his name or photograph in a news broadcast because "[iln the news
broadcasting situation, plaintiff is not possessed of any property right." E. KINTR & J. LAHR,
supra note 51, at 459. But a performer's interest in his entire performance is purely a property
right, so there can be no news privilege in that situation. See note 81 supra and accompanying
text.
148 433 U.S. at 569.
149 433 U.S. at 581 (Powell, J., dissenting).
1,0 1 A. HANSON, supra note 78 at § 137. See Cepeda v. Cowles Magazines and Broadcasting,
Inc., 328 F.2d 869, 872-73 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 844 (1964). The privilege of fair
comment is based on the rationale that the social value of free interchange of opinions outweighs
the injury that such discussion might cause an individual in the public eye. Fisher v. Washington
Post Co., 212 A.2d 335, 337 (D.C. Ct. App. 1965). "One who engages in a public field, whether of
entertainment, sport or politics must expect such critical review." Oma v. Hillman Periodicals,
Inc., 281 App. Div. 240, 243, 118 N.Y.S.2d 720, 723 (1953). Fair comment originated in the law of
defamation as a privilege of the press to publish defamatory opinion on matters or persons of
public interest. C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 1033 (1959).
However, fair comment should also be applicable in privacy and publicity cases, even though
plaintiff's complaint is not that he has been defamed, but that his name, photograph, or facts
about him-have been used in news commentary. Cf. Oma v. Hillman Periodicals, 281 App.
Div. 240, 244, 118 N.Y.S.2d 720, 724 (1953) (fair comment privilege applied to privacy claim);
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al privilege, fair comment is based on truthful reporting, since the privilege is
lost unless the comment is based upon facts truly stated and is an honest
expression of the writer's opinion based on those facts.' 5 1 Matters of public
interest which may be commented upon by the press include works of
literature, art, music, entertainment, sports, and politics.
52
The news media must determine in each instance how much of the actual
performance, book, or work of art may be utilized in a news story or review
without the consent of the performer or creator. An appropriate guide for
the scope of permissible taking would be the limitation placed upon fair use in
copyright law. Even though live performances are not generally considered
copyrightable, 153 the similarities in the interests protected by the right of
publicity and by copyright support reliance upon fair use standards.
154
Fair use is a privilege in persons other than the copyright holder to use the
copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without the holder's consent.1
55
Allowing fair use protects first amendment interests by allowing the public's
interest in dissemination of information to outweigh the creator's right to
compensation. 156 Purposes for which a work may fairly be used include news
reporting, criticism, and teaching. 15 7 Factors to be considered in determining
whether the use is fair are both qualitative and quantitative, including the
purpose and character of the use, the nature of the copyrighted work, the
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the work as a
whole, and the effect of the use upon the value of or potential market for the
work. 58 Under these standards a. complete or nearly total taking of another's
Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (use of celebrity's photograph for
fair comment would be privileged invasion of right of publicity).
151 Golden North Airways, Inc. v. Tanana Publishing Co., 218 F.2d 612, 627 (9th Cir. 1954);
Fisher v. Washington Post Co., 212 A.2d 335, 337 (D.C. 1965); Association for the Preservation of
Freedom of Choice, Inc. v. National Assoc., 14 App. Div. 2d 751, 220 N.Y.S.2d 391 (1961).
The privilege of fair comment differs in several ways from the common law news privilege to
invade the right of privacy. To qualify as fair comment, the report must represent an expression
of opinion, as noted in the authorities cited above. A news report, on the other hand, must be a
truthful statement of fact. See note 143 supra and accompanying text. In addition, fair
comment must deal with a person's acts, rather than with his character, and must deal only with
the person's public, rather than private activities. Golden North Airways v. Tanana Publishing
Co., 218 F.2d at 612; F. HARPER & F. JAMEs, supra note 56, § 5.28, at 458-61.
152 F. HARPER & F. JAMEs, supra note 56, § 5.28, at 456-57. E.g., New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 282 (1964) (criticism of official conduct of elected official); Oma v.
Hillman, 281 App. Div. 240, 118 N.Y.S.2d 720 (1953) (criticism of sport of professional boxing);
Fisher v. Washington Post Co., 212 A.2d 335 (D.C. 1965) (criticism of art exhibition).
151 See note 140 supra and accompanying text.
154 See note 84 supra and accompanying text.
155 Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
156 Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978).
(1978); New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217, 221 (D.N.J.
1977). See Sobel, supra note 138, at 51.
"' Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 107, 90 Stat. 2546 (1976) (effective January 1,
1978). The fair use defense to copyright infringement is judge-made; the first statutory
recognition of this doctrine was its incorporation into the Copyright Act revision. 2 M. NuIME,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 145, at 643 (rev. ed. 1976). See H. R. REP. No.94-1476,94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 65 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5678.
15' Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 107,90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (effective January 1,
1978); New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217,221 (D.N.J. 1977).
A greater amount of borrowing will be considered fair when the purpose of the borrowing is for
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copyrighted work without permission is not fair use,5 9 even when the work is
used for the purpose of news reporting. 60 The use of brief excerpts from a
work is sufficient to enable the press to fulfill its function of informing the
public.' 6' The copyright holder's function in this scheme is to maintain
control over the public presentation of the work in its entirety.16 2 The
criticism and educational purposes than when the borrowing is for defendant's commercial use.
Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 131 F. Supp. 165, 176 (S.D. Cal. 1955), aff'dsub nor.
Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd mem., 356 U.S. 43 (1958). Courts may
also consider factors other than those enumerated in the new copyright law in determining
whether the use is fair. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess 65 (1976), reprinted in [1976]
U.S. CODE CONC. & AD. NEWS, 5659, 5679. Other factors include the intent with which the
borrowing was done, the amount of the labor expended by the user, the benefit gained by the
user, and the relative value of the original work and the copy. Sobel, supra note 138, at 51.
Another factor which should be considered, especially when the use is for news reporting
purposes, is the degree of public interest in access to the copyrighted work. Material that should
as a matter of policy be widely disseminated should receive less protection than material in which
the public has a lesser interest. E. KINTNER & J. LAHR, supra note 51, at 425. In Time, Inc. v.
Bernard Geis Assoc., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), the use of copies of frames from the
copyrighted Zapruder film of President Kennedy's assassination to illustrate defendant's book
about the assassination was held to be fair use. The court found that the public interest in having
full information on the assassination outweighed plaintiff's copyright interest in the film. See
Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303,309 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 1009 (1967) (public interest in Howard Hughes justified use of copyrighted magazine
articles about Hughes in preparation of his biography); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978) (appellate court overturned summary judgment that
defendants' unauthorized use of copyrighted letters of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg was not fair
use; decision was based in part on the great public interest in the trial of the Rosenbergs for
espionage, which was the subject of defendant's book).
The public interest in an entertainer's uncopyrighted performance should be considered in
determining how much of the performance can be used in news reporting, since the right of
publicity, like copyright, can be weighed against first amendment considerations. See notes 133-
41 supra and accompanying text. There may, however, be less public interest or "news value" in
pure entertainment, so that only a small excerpt from a performance should be used for news
purposes. See notes 125 & 126 supra and accompanying text.
15' Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff 'd mem., 356 U.S. 43 (1958); Leon v.
Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1937); Robert Stigwood Group, Ltd. v. O'Reilly, 346
F. Supp. 376 (D. Conn. 1972).
In determining the quantitative amount of a copyrighted work that may be used without
permission, courts consider the substantiality of the taking; that is, whether the copy is
substantially similar to the original. If it is, the use may not be fair. Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239
F.2d at 537; Berlin v. E. C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822
(1964); Musto v. Meyer, 434 F. Supp. 32,34 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Copying of an entire work results in
complete similarity, which is not fair use.
160 The defense of fair use is not necessarily applicable when the defendant's use serves the
function of reporting news or factual matters of public interest. 2 M. NIMMER, NIiMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 145, at 647 n.190 (rev. ed. 1976). See Public Affairs Assoc. v. Rickover, 284 F.2d 262
(D.C. Cir. 1960), vacated for insufficient record, 369 U.S. 111 (1962). In copyright law, as with
the right of publicity, the press has no automatic first amendment privilege to take an entire work
without permission. See notes 138-41 supra and accompanying text.
"I1 Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822
(1964); Robert Stigwood Group, Ltd. v. O'Reilly, 346 F. Supp. 376, 385 (D. Conn. 1972).
By including news reporting in the fair use section of the Copyright Act revision, the drafters
had in mind the use of a "summary . . . with brief quotations [or] incidental and fortuitous
reproduction, in a newsreel or broadcast, of a work located at the scene of an event being
reported." H.R. REP. No. 94-1476,94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5679 (emphasis added). Congress did not intend to allow the news
media to reproduce intentially an entire copyrighted work, just as the Supreme Court in Zacchini
refused to allow the media to reproduce an entire non-copyrighted performance.
112 Functional analysis is another means of determining whether a particular use of a
copyrighted work without permission is fair. When the original and the copy fulfill the same
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Zacchini opinion implied that the news media might have a fair comment
type of privilege to show part of an entertainer's non-copyrightable perfor-
mance during a news broadcast.'63 As with fair use, however, the Court
found the showing of a complete performance to be unprivileged, no matter
how brief the performance.
IV. CONCLUSION
Zacchini is the first case in which an entertainer successfully alleged that
the appropriation of an entire performance for use on a television news
program was unprivileged. 164 The implication of the Zacchini holding is that
not everything that appears on a news program is necessarily news. The
Court's opinion reinforces the general rule that the news media is liable for
torts committed during the course of newsgathering16 5 The first amendment
does not grant the press carteblanche to invade all of a newsworthy person's
interests in order to inform the public.
The dissenting opinion disagreed sharply, stating that everything on a
news program is privileged as news unless the media clearly intends to exploit
a performance for commercial or other similar use. 16  The dissenters felt that
respondent's use of Zacchini's performance was not commercial exploitation,
even though the television station sold advertising time during the news
broadcast. 167 The station's advertising revenue, the dissent believed, would
function in terms of satisfying actual or potential consumer demand, a lesser amount of similarity
will be considered fair use than when the two works fulfill different functions. A different
function can be performed without resort to complete copying of another's works. M. NIMMER,
NWIMER ON CoPYIcrr § 145 (rev. ed. 1976). For example, in Loew's Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal. 1955), aff'd sub nom. Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239
F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd mem., 356 U.S. 43 (1958), comedian Jack Benny performed on
television a parody of the movie "Gaslight" which used substantial portions of the movie script.
This was held not to be fair use because the court thought it likely that many people who saw the
television parody would not go to see the movie. The television parody fulfilled the same
function in terms of consumer demand as the movie.
Hugo Zacchini's complaint was in the same vein: "[I]f the public can see the act for free on
television, they will be less willing to pay to see it at the fair." 433 U.S. at 575. The Court opined
that the value of Zacchini's act might have been increased by the unwanted publicity, so that he
could not recover actual damages. But under copyright law, as under the right of publicity, it is
the taking without consent, rather than the effect of the taking, which damages the plaintiff. See
Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964);
Loew's v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 131 F. Supp. at 176; Nimmer, supra note 135, at 1201.
10 The Court limited its holding to unauthorized showing of an entire performance. 433
U.S. at 574.
164 In previous cases in which the defense of news privilege was raised by a television station,
plaintiff's performance was used in a so-called "commercial" program. E.g., Gautier v. Pro-
Football, Inc., 304 N.Y. 354, 107 N.E.2d 485 (App. Div. 1952) (broadcast of professional football
game); Sharkey v. National Broadcasting Co., 93 F. Supp. 986 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) ("Greatest Flights
of the Century" program).
165 See note 113 supra.
116 433 U.S. at 581 (Powell, J., dissenting).
167 There was no direct association of Zacchini's act with any of the commercials that
appeared on the news broadcast. Some courts have required proof of such a direct association to
find a television station liable. E.g., Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 304 N.Y. 354, 107 N.E.2d 485
(App. Div. 1952); Young v. That Was The Week That Was, 312 F. Supp. 1337 (N.D. Ohio 1969),
aff'd, 423 F.2d 265 (6th Cir. 1970). The California statute which creates a cause of action for
unauthorized use of an individual's name, photograph, or likeness for advertising or solicitation
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have been the same no matter which news items appeared on the show. 168 In
his dissent from the Ohio Supreme Court's opinion in Zacchini, however,
Judge Celebrezze questioned whether WEWS' decision to broadcast the
performance had been influenced by the potential effect on its commercial
ratings.169
In recent years the content of television news programming has become
entertainment-oriented for blatantly commercial reasons. So-called "happy
talk" or "eyewitness news" programs have become widespread on television
news.17 0 The main characteristics of this format are reporting by personable
and attractive news people who banter with each other during the newscast,
use of exciting "visuals" (film footage) whenever possible to create "audience
interest," devotion of less coverage to more important stories that lack
exciting film, use of a large number of-short stories, treating each with little
depth, and greater emphasis on human interest and amusing or entertaining
stories.' 7' Items of pure entertainment and comedy, which may lack real
news value, are used as fillers. 1 7  This type of news format, which is followed
by the television station which broadcast Zacchini's performance, 7 3 has been
severely criticized for transforming some news programs into entertainment
rather than sources of information.17 4  The purpose of this type of news
format is to attract a greater number of viewers, thereby increasing the
states that use in a news story is not advertising use. Under that statute, in addition, a commercial
medium may be held liable only upon a showing of a direct connection between the use of
plaintiff's name or likeness and the advertising carried by that medium. CAL. CIv. CODE §
3344(d), 3344 (e) (West Supp. 1977).
168433 U.S. at 580 n.2 (Powell, J., dissenting). This assertion is probably incorrect. The type
of stories that appear on a television news program can have a great effect on the amount of the
station's revenues. See note 175 infra and accompanying text.
119 47 Ohio St. 2d at 243, 351 N.E.2d at 466.
170 See generally Dominick, Wurtzel & Lometti, Television Journalism vs. Show Business: A
Content Analysis of Eyewitness News, 52 JOURNALISM Q. 213 (1975); Powers, Eyewitness News,
COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. 17 (May/June 1977); Revzin, Entertainment: Action are Major
Ingredients of the Local TV News, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 1976, at 1, col. 1.
"I Powers, supra note 170, at 21; Dominick, supra note 170, passim. Powers cites several
examples of this type of news. A story about unidentified flying objects was included in the
weather report on a Chicago television station. In Washington, D.C., a local television reporter
was shown sitting in a cemetery as she delivered a story on Howard Hughes' will. A reporter for
the NBC affiliate in Cleveland was mauled as he broadcast a story on"learning how" to train a lion
from inside the lion's cage. The entire episode was filmed and was shown on several NBC
stations as news. Powers, supra note 170, at 17. The use of "action reporters" who are
conspicuous participants in the stories they cover is another typical feature of this type of news
programming. Id. at 18.
172 Dominick, supra note 170, at 215. Examples of entertainment and comedy with
questionable news value include the female reporter for a Los Angeles television station who
donned a wet suit, plunged into a tank of water, and played with a porpoise. On anews program
in Minneapolis, comedienne Judy Cane popped into the newsroom and played with the
sportscaster's ears during the broadcast. Powers, supra note 170, at 17.
173 Revzin's Wall Street Journal article on the use of entertainment in local TV news
programming features WEWS, the defendant television station in the Zacchini case, as an
example of the Eyewitness News format in broadcasting. Revzin, supra note 170.
In one instance of "action reporting" by WEWS, two women reporters dressed in short skirts
stationed themselves on the street in a Cleveland red-light district to test the effectiveness of a city
crackdown on prostitution during 1977. A cameraman perched on a nearby rooftop filmed the
solicitation of the women by four men, followed by the women's arrest by police for suspicion of
prostitution. Plain Dealer (Cleveland), Sept. 1, 1977, at 14A, col. 1.
171 See authorities cited in note 170 supra.
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station's revenue and profits.7 5 The increase in a station's profits resulting
from a switch to an "eyewitness news" format can be considerable.'
It remains to be seen how much entertainment the media can utilize in its
news programming while still remaining within first amendment and com-
mon law reporting privileges. So far, no court has found a conflict between
the news reporting function and the fact that the news media is operated for
profit. In almost every case the press has been allowed to define for itself
what is news, and this definition has included items of popular appeal. But
the Zacchini decision should serve as a reminder to producers of "happy talk"
news programs that the basic first amendment function of the news media is
"to monitor and report on the conduct of public officials and others who
exercise power over private citizens so as to assure openness, accountability,
and the intelligent administration of community life.'
177
When the television news media does decide to report on an entertainer's
performance, the Zacchini decision will result in a more cautious determina-
tion of how the story should be presented. Under the Zacchini rule the entire
performance may not be presented if the performer has explicitly refused to
consent, as Zacchini did. The Court's opinion gave no guideline for deter-
mining how much less than the entire performance may be used, but
reference to the guidelines traditionally applied in fair comment and fair use
situations, as this Note has suggested, should provide sufficient guidance
consistent with first amendment principles. At the same time, entertainers
must realize that they have no legal right to recover damages for the broadcast
of their entire performances if they have consented to use of the entire act, or
if they have assigned their publicity right to a promoter or other person who
then gave such consent. One may question whether the news media now has
the burden of ascertaining whether a performer's publicity rights have been
assigned before it may report on his act. The Zacchini decision seems to
answer in the negative. Use of reasonable excerpts from a performance in a
news report about the performance will not give rise to liability for invasion of
the performer's right of publicity.
BECKY MOSES
175 Revzin, supra note 170, at 25 col. 1; Dominick, supra note 170, at 213. "Often (as in the case
with the fifteen network-owned stations and the dozens of other 'group' stations) the TV news
staff responds to the pure marketing priorities of absentee ownership." Powers, supra note 170,
at 24.
176 Powers, supra note 170, at 24.
177 Id.
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